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THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN DETERMINING
INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
AND OF THE FEDERAL COURTS:
A COMMENT ON THE HORIZONTAL EFFECT
OF THE SWEEPING CLAUSE*
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNEt
Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper to carry into execution ...all ...powers vested by this Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer
thereof.
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18
(emphasis added).
Loose and irresponsible use of adjectives colors all nonlegal and much
legal discussion of presidential powers. "Inherent" powers, "implied" powers,
"incidental" powers, "plenary" powers, "war" powers and "emergency" pow-
ers are used, often interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable mean-
ings.
With all its defects, delays and inconveniences, men have discovered
no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive
be under the law, and that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.
Such institutions may be destined to pass away. But it is the duty of the
Court to be the last, not first, to give them up.
Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring,
Yonngston Sheet and Tube Company v. Sawyer.
INTRODUCTION
Our recent years have been a halcyon period of constitutional debate over
the implied and incidental powers of the presidency. While other presidents
had individually laid claim to certain very broad prerogatives, rarely were so
many different kinds of implied executive power asserted and challenged dur-
ing a single President's administration as during the Nixon years. Even a brief
list of the Nixon cases is an impressive one.
They are shadowed on one side by the extraordinary summer session of
the Supreme Court that rebuffed the executive attempt to suppress the publi-
* An earlier version of this paper was presented in the Spring 1975 as part of the Law Lecture
Series at Ohio State University. It is substantially republished here with the permission of the
Ohio State Lao Journal, in which it originally appeared at 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 788 (1975).
t William R. Perkins Professor of Law, Duke University.
1. 343 U.S. 579, 646-47, 655 (1952) (emphasis added).
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cation of the Pentagon Papers.2 They are closed out at the other end by the
climactic order of the Supreme Court that pried loose additional pieces of the
Watergate Tapes-the release of which at once ended the President's last ves-
tiges of support in the House of Representatives.' Linked with the first of
these decisions was the subsequent trial of Daniel Ellsberg, a trial aborted
because of executive failure to disclose information deemed pertinent to the
defense.' Connected with the second decision was a series of companion lower
court cases, including two that rejected congressional requests for the tapes,
ruling first against the Senate Select Committee's demand, 5 and then against a
later attempt under reformulated committee authority.6 Another addressed
itself to the dismissal of Special Prosecutor Cox, 7 and still another withheld
general release of the tapes held by the district court under the Supreme
Court's decision in United States v. Nixon.8
Within the same general period, the executive's claimed exemption from
the judicial requirements of the fourth amendment was tested-and found
wanting-in respect to surveillance of alleged domestic subversives.9 The
claim of a near-absolute impoundment power was tested nearly two dozen
times in lower courts."' The scope of the executive war-making power was
repeatedly challenged, albeit with no willingness by the Supreme Court major-
ity to examine even the justiciability of the dispute."1
Prompted by investigative news reports, suits were also brought (without
success) to test the licitness of domestic surveillance by the Army 2 and to
ascertain the real budget of the CIA.13 Even the reach of the "pocket veto"
power was challenged in a pro se action by Senator Kennedy. The suit pro-
ceeded successfully through the level of a federal court of appeals,' 4 only to
be frustrated by the decision of the Solicitor General not to seek review in the
Supreme Court, even as the President continued to exercise the alleged power
under circumstances inconsistent with the rationale of the appellate decision.
2. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
3. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generalty Symposium: United States v.
Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4 (1974).
4. See N.Y. Times, May 12, 1973, at 1, col. 8; id. at 14, col. 5.
5. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51 (D.D.C. 1973).
6. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
7. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
8. Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975).
9. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See also Zweibon v. Mit-
chell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc), rev'g 363 F. Supp. 936 (D.D.C. 1973).
10. See Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975), and the cases cited therein at n. 15.
11. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971);
Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 945 (1967); Mora v. McNa-
mara, 363 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
12. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
13. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974).
14. Kennedy v, Sampson 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
ROLE OF CONGRESS
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
Several of the most publicized executive claims, e.g., the blunt rejection of
the House Judiciary Committee subpoenas, and the allegations of personal
presidential involvement in unconstitutional invasions of various civil liberties
and in the obstruction of justice, were tested in a different kind of "court,"
precipitating the most extended debate of the impeachment power the coun-
try has known. All in all, not since Reconstruction were the press, the public,
Congress, and the courts so overwhelmed by constitutional imbroglios of ex-
ecutive authority in such a very brief span.
Still, to call these "halcyon years" may seem dismally misplaced, as though
one finds an incorrigible pleasure in the nation's problems simply because
those problems also rekindled a popular interest in a variety of constitutional
questions. In proper perspective, no doubt the more serious issue was not
whether this act by Mr. Nixon, or that omission by Mr. Nixon, ran afoul of
one or another constitutional restraint. Rather, the general issue raised by the
aggregate of presidential actions was whether, by encouragement as well as by
drift, the nation in general had made it altogether too likely that the kinds of
things that did occur could happen so easily. More specifically, had we our-
selves contributed to the growth and hazard of an imperial presidency by cele-
brating the virtues of a modern executive and by denigrating the ineptitude
of Congress?
Much learned writing over a period of decades had appeared not only to
explain the evident drift toward executive power, but also to rationalize the
rightness and inevitability of that drift.1 5 The sheer unmanageable bulk of the
House of Representatives, the revolving two-year terms of its members, and
their constant dependency upon narrowly self-interested constituencies were
repeatedly contrasted with the more nationally representative character of the
President as Chief Executive and leader of his party. The superior organiza-
tion of the executive, seen as more able to command, to integrate informa-
15. See J. BELL, THE PRESIDENCY: OFFICE OF POWER (1967); W. BINKLEY, PRESIDENT AND
CONGRESS (3d ed. 1962); J. BURNS, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT; THE CRUCIBLE OF LEADERSHIP
(1965); M. CUNLIFFE, AMERICAN PRESIDENTS AND THE PRESIDENCY (1972); E. HARGROVE,
PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP; PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL STYLE (1966); F. HELLER, THE PRESI-
DENCY; A MODERN PERSPECTIVE (1960); E. HERRING, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP; THE POLITICAL
RELATIONS OF CONGRESS AND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE (1940); E. HUGHES, THE LIVING PRESIDENCY;
THE RESOURCES AND DILEMMAS OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTIAL OFFICE (1973); H. LASKI, THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN INTERPRETATION (1940); C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (2d
ed. 1960); C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP; CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN THE MODERN
DEMOCRACIES (1948); C. ROSSITER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF (1951).
But see E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1957 (4th ed. 1957); H. FINER, THE
PRESIDENCY: CRISIS AND REGENERATION, AN ESSAY IN POSSIBILITIES (1960); C. PATTERSON,
PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES; THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (1947); G.
REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF THE PRESIDENCY (1970); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY
(1973); R. TUGWELL, THE ENLARGEMENT OF THE PRESIDENCY (1960). See also R. RANKIN, THE
PRESIDENCY IN TRANSITION (1949); A. SCHLESINGER, JR., & A. DE GRAZIA, CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENCY: THEIR ROLE IN MODERN TIMES (1967) (debates); THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY (S. War-
ren ed. 1967) (collections of essays, supporting both views).
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tion, and to formulate policy in the national interest, was often commended
for its virtues. The debilitating influence of veto groups in congressional af-
fairs and the felt shortcomings of government by gerontocracy in the congres-
sional committee system were disparaged for their vices.
Because of these strong feelings that the executive was more representa-
tive, expert, efficient, and detached, and less dependent upon inveigling in-
terest groups, Congress was repeatedly encouraged to transfer authority and
depend upon presidential initiative.' 6 Whatever its weaknesses, Congress was
invited to succumb to them, in part by arrangements of modern legal doc-
trines enabling Congress to relieve itself of the tasks (and onus) associated
with the obsolete notion of 1789 that Congress, not the President, would be
primus inter pares among the three branches of national government. The fed-
eral courts, for example, cooperated very generously in sustaining all con-
tested delegations of power after Panama Refining Company v. Ryan I 7 and
even the few courts willing to treat the war power clause as justiciable readily
found sufficient congressional acquiescence to sustain every executive deci-
sion.
The federal judiciary doubtless occupies but one small corner in the de-
velopment of the fullness of executive power, but it is nonetheless true that
the judiciary's ready acquiescence has been a substantial contributing influ-
ence in that development. It is, after all, for the courts to declare in the
course of adjudication the breadth of each express, enumerated executive
power and to give (or to deny) a separate scope of independent meanings to
"the executive power" that is vested in "a President."'" It has also been their
16. One of the less visible but more important examples of this is the executive's superior
command in the preparation of the budget, a task to which Congress' committee review is pres-
ently unequal, and which can be seen as marking the locus of real initiative.
17. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 90-91 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted):
1 also agree in substance with my Brother BRENNAN's view that the grant of author-
ity by Congress to the Secretary of the Treasury is too broad to pass constitutional mus-
ter. This legislation is symptomatic of the slow eclipse of Congress by the mounting
Executive power. The phenomenon is not brand new. It was reflected in Schechter Corp.
v. United States .... United States v. Robel . . . is a more recent example. National Cable
Television Assn. v. United States . . . and FPC v. New England Power Co .... are even more
recent. These omnibus grants of power allow the Executive Branch to make the law as it
chooses in violation of the teachings of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer .. .as well
as Schechter, that lawmaking is a congressional, not an Executive, function.
See also E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1797-1957, at 9 (4th ed. 1957):
The doctrine of the Separation of Powers comprises . . .one of the two great struc-
tural principles of the American constitutional system; and from it certain other ideas
follow logically, even though not inevitably . . . thirdly, that none of the departments
may abdicate its powers to either of the others. [This idea] has today almost completely
disappeared as a viable principle of American constitutional law.
18. See note 97 infra and accompanying text.
ROLE OF CONGRESS
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
lot to consider claims of "inherent" executive power.1 a Similarly, there is a
considerable judicial history regarding the necessity, or lack thereof, for an-
tecedent acts of Congress as a prerequisite of executive action. Further, in
construing acts of Congress relied upon by the executive, the federal judiciary
has clearly affected the executive power by the breadth or conservatism of its
statutory constructions. And plainly, the extent to which the courts have al-
lowed nonspecific delegations of authority by Congress to the President, as
well as the judiciary's readiness to find such authority implied by the mere
passivity of Congress, has necessarily affected the balance and distribution of
power within the national government.
Given this widespread view that the Constitution ought not to be bound to
the simplicity of government in 1789, and given further the apparent confir-
mation by political science of the value of a freer executive as against the
ill-structured decrepitude of Congress, there could be only praise of the Su-
preme Court for recognizing the realities and for conforming judicial (and
constitutional) doctrine accordingly. Thus, for the most part, judges finding
good reason to sustain the transfer of authority away from Congress received
praise and encouragement for their practical enlightenment in giving breath-
ing room to the needs of the country and for recognizing the wisdom of
allowing nonelected experts to make the law. On the other hand, judges who
constrained divisions of national power within a more rigid, less yielding
1789-type model were frequently derided as having forgotten that it was a
constitution being expounded, i.e., a document that to be enduring must also
be progressive and capable of responding to vastly altered circumstances.
It may very well be that all these things should continue and that the
present pause in our thinking is merely a transient reaction to the trigger-
word WATERGATE. Some proposals do seem substantially of that ill-con-
sidered kind, e.g., the proposal to separate the whole of the Department of
Justice from control of the President: putting outside the President's power
the determination of antitrust, tax, criminal, civil, and civil rights enforcement
policies (to name but a few), to avoid any President's political manipulations
of enforcement policy in that area. Aside from the suggestion that such legis-
lative efforts to fragment "the" executive power (which the Constitution vests
wholly in "a" President) might be unconstitutional regardless of their felt
desirability,2" even many of those most disaffected by Watergate see proposals
such as this one as manifestly excessive. 21 But the fact that such extreme
19. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), and cases cited therein; Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
20. See Van Alstyne, A Political and Constitutional Review of United States v. Nixon, 22 U.C.L.A.
L. REx'. 116, 130-40 (1974).
21. See, e.g., testimony by Archibald Cox opposing this proposal, in Hearings on S. 2803 and S.
2978 Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
197-213 (1974).
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proposals have been made in earnest may also be sobering in a larger
sense-that we ought not be too quick to reverse the judicial "progressivism"
steadily urged upon the courts since at least the Great Depression.
In spite of all this, however, one cannot help becoming interested again in
the old questions of judicial treatment of the horizontal distribution of na-
tional power. This essay, arising from a particular uneasiness with the
judiciary's treatment of "incidental" executive power, is one narrow and
highly tentative result.
Put briefly, I think that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the very
permissive view the executive has assumed in respect to the proper source
and scope of incidental executive power. A fair case may be made that this
power may be, constitutionally, far more dependent upon a requirement of
congressional determination than has been commonly supposed. A textual
source of this dependency may rest in the relatively unexamined second half
of the very best known clause in the Constitution-the "necessary and proper"
clause.2 2 What I should like to do is to provide the outline of a fair argument
for its more conscientious use. I hope to demonstrate that this part is neither
a mere redundancy that adds nothing to the document, nor simply a loose
acknowledgment that Congress may affirmatively limit the reach of incidental
executive or judicial powers. Rather, I will contend that this clause assigns to
Congress alone the responsibility to say by law what additional authority, if
any, the executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of powers that
are indispensable, rather than merely appropriate, or helpful, to the perfor-
mance of their express duties under articles 1I and III of the Constitution.
I
THE SUGGESTED HORIZONTAL EFFECT OF THE
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
It may be helpful to review at the outset certain ancillary executive (and
judicial)23 powers that have been of recent concern. A review of the treatment
of these claims of incidental power in the courts, as contrasted with their
treatment under an approach that assigns a more significant responsibility to
Congress, may help reveal the implications in the obscure half of the "neces-
sary and proper" clause.
The most obvious current illustration of an implied executive power is that
22. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
23. 1 mean to include the courts in this discussion for two reasons: first, the better to test the
neutrality of the argument to be advanced-i.e., that the argument not trade upon the current
uneasiness about executive power alone, but that its acceptability be judged equally in respect to
the judiciary to which it may equally apply; and second, because at least as many of the very few
early illustrations of the (horizontal) effect of the sweeping clause were given in reference to the
judiciary as in reference to the executive.
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of "executive privilege. ' 24 Presidents have taken the view that just as Congress
may make provision for all things it not unreasonably deems necessary and
proper in aid of its own enumerated powers granted in article I of the Con-
stitution, so also may the President in aid of the enumerated executive powers
granted in article II. Thus, as the establishment of a privilege of executive
confidentiality might, by encouraging additional candor of communication
within the executive department, be helpful to the President in the discharge
of his constitutional duties, it must obviously be within the discretion of the
President to provide for such a privilege on his own initiative, in much the
same fashion as Congress may draw upon the resources of the "necessary and
proper" clause in the expedient implementation of its own powers. Or so, at
least, the claim has been asserted. 25
The usual course of judicial review of claims of executive privilege has not
much quarreled with this view of implied (or incidental) executive power. In
fact, it appears to be very much in accord with it. The claim is not allowed
absolute sway, but it is given keen respect in the course of balancing it against
any rival claim for discovery-exactly as Judge Gesell did in respect to the
Senate Select Committee, 26 as the Supreme Court did (in dictum) in United
States v. Nixon,2 7 or as was done in United States v. Reynolds.2 8 And in any case,
the legitimacy of its source, i.e., an executive source, is seldom questioned
insofar as the privilege is claimed by the President only in respect to the ex-
ecutive department itself.
The rationale underlying the view that the President is not dependent
upon Congress for the creation of rules of executive privilege is said to be
grounded in the principle of separated powers. Thus, a neutral application of
that principle would appear to hold that none of the three principal branches
of national government should be dependent upon either of the other two in
the exercise of ancillary powers and privileges logically related to its separate
constitutional responsibilities. (Even so, each branch may, of course, ultimately
have to depend upon the cooperation of the others to carry out its own de-
sign.)
This claim of coequal authority to initiate ancillary rules and privileges
within each branch can also be supported by an argument of fair analogy. It
24. The subject is extensively reviewed in R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CoX-
STITUTIONAL MYTH (1974); Berger, Executive Privilege v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
1044, 1288 (1965); Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974); Dorsen & Shattuck,
Executive Privilege, The Congress and the Courts, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1974); Symposium: United States
v. Nixon, supra note 3.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,694); Berger, supra
note 24.
26. Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 370 F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), aff'd, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
27. 418 U.S. 683 (1974). See generally discussion at part II infra.
28. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
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seems sensible that insofar as Congress has great latitude of legislative discre-
tion in respect to its express powers pursuant to article I, the executive and
judiciary must surely possess a similar initial latitude of discretion in respect
to their express powers pursuant to articles II and III. Thus, as Congress may
range quite far,2 9 so also may the executive and judiciary.
At least this is so, according to the conventional view, of an initiating
authority within the executive and judiciary to develop rules helpful (albeit
not necessarily indispensable) to their duties. Insofar as Congress is acknowl-
edged to be primus inter pares, it is only deemed to be so in the event of direct
conflict with another branch 3°-and sometimes not even then.3 1 The point is
very well illustrated in one portion of Justice Jackson's famous concurring
opinion in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer:31 Courts should most readily
defer to executive action confirmed by act of Congress; they should generally
defer when Congress has been silent (or has appeared silently to have
acquiesced); 33 and they should defer least when Congress has affirmatively
denied such authority unless, in the Court's view, Congress has thereby acted
to abridge an express or indispensable incidental executive power.3 4 The de-
gree of judicial review is highly deferential, i.e., likely to sustain the executive
claim, by a standard of "reasonableness" similar to that applied to acts of
Congress supported by the "necessary and proper" clause, as to an initial
claim of executive authority to innovate rules and privileges for its own
assistance.3 5
It is not at all difficult to find similar examples of incidental or implied
powers in the judiciary. Here, too, a claim of coequal authority to initiate
rules conducive to the judiciary's express powers has sometimes been made,
subject only to a limited power of congressional override. The "supervisory"
29. See, e.g., opinion of Marshall, C.J., in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1918).
30. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In fact, however, neither case presents a "direct conflict"
between an act of Congress and an exertion of executive power. At most, the conflict was "indi-
rect," i.e., insofar as Congress had considered the subject matter pertinent to the executive in-
terest and had provided statutory authority only up to a certain point, the omission of Congress
to provide any further statutory authority was deemed to reflect a congressional decision against
such authority. See also note 32 infra.
31. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
32. 343 U.S. at 635-38. It is also true, however, that "the opinion of the Court" was written by
Mr. Justice Black, and that four of the other Justices (Douglas, Frankfurter, Jackson, and Burton)
expressly concurred in that opinion (and not simply in the judgment itself). The opinion of the
Court is explicitly supportive of the horizontal effect of the sweeping clause set forth in this essay,
supra at 588-89. See also Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L.
REV. 53, 56 (1953): "The pivotal proposition of the opinion is, in brief, that inasmuch as Con-
gress could have ordered the seizure of the steel mills, there was a total absence of power in the
president to do so without prior congressional authorization."
33. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
34. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52.
35. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
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authority of the Supreme Court is a familiar example.36 A different, very
recent, illustration is found in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents,3 7 which sus-
tained a claim for money damages for a fourth amendment violation even
though Congress had made no provision for that kind of remedy. Bivens is
especially instructive because of the highly specific standard that the Court
used in stating its own authority to grant the particular remedy sought in the
case and because of what it said about that standard.
The Supreme Court majority in Bivens declared that the Court did not
need to reach the question whether the furnishing of money damages would
be indispensable to the exercise of judicial power, i.e., indispensable to the ex-
press judicial duty to decide the case in the sense mandated by article III
consistent with the fourth amendment. Rather, it was enough that such a rem-
edy was appropriate and, in the absence of an affirmative restriction imposed
by Congress, the standard of "appropriateness" was one the Court was im-
plicitly at liberty to use.38 The similarity of this standard of implied ancillary
judicial discretion to the standard recognized in respect to Congress under
the "necessary and proper" clause--i.e., "appropriate," as Chief Justice Mar-
shall called it in McCulloch v. Maryland39-is striking. It appears to hold that
the judiciary possesses much the same discretion to invoke whatever ancillary
authority courts may find "necessary and proper" (in the generous sense of
that phrase) as Congress may do in respect to its own separate powers as
enumerated in article I-or as the President may do in respect to his own
powers as enumerated in article II.
Affirmative restrictions subsequently enacted by Congress to limit execu-
tive or judicial innovations can doubtless furnish a significant restraint upon
the scope of ancillary executive and judicial powers, but they are much less
effective in restraining the President and the Court than would be the case if
those two branches were unable to engage in "appropriate" innovations with-
out legislative authorization. It is far easier to forestall legislation authorizing
the executive or judiciary to act than to muster the necessary majorities to
contradict an "established" executive or judicial practice. Would we not con-
clude that the Congress' role was a far more important one if judicial practice
corresponded more closely with the following proposition than with that al-
ready described?
36. For a review and discussion, see, e.g., Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Supenisory Power, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 181 (1969); Note, The Judge-Made Supervisory Power of the Federal Courts, 53 GEO.
L.J. 1050 (1965). Professor Hill concludes his article with a sentence that I think may be sup-
ported by the thesis of this essay (which itself emphasizes the lack of merely appropriate, ancillary
judicial power in the absence of statutory authority): "If the remedial implications of a statutory
or constitutional violation are rationally determinable, and the judiciary exceeds them, then it is
the judiciary that is acting lawlessly." Hill, supra at 215.
37. 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For an excellent review of the case see Dellinger, Of Rights and
Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1532 (1972).
38. 403 U.S. at 397, 402-10.
39. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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Neither the executive nor the judiciary possesses any powers not essential (as
distinct from those that may be merely helpful or appropriate) to the perfor-
mance of its enumerated duties as an original matter-and each can exercise
a wider scope of incidental power if, but only if, Congress itself has deter-
mined such powers to be necessary and proper.
If this (or something reasonably like it) were the test, a proper anlaysis in
most cases would run not from the question whether the President has
claimed some incidental authority that may be logically conducive to, but not
required by, his business and not denied by Congress, but rather from this
question: "Has Congress seen fit to provide the President with the 'incidental'
authority he now asserts?" And similarly with regard to the federal courts:
"Has Congress seen fit to provide the federal judiciary with the 'incidental'
authority the Court has presumed to invoke?" In short, the authorizing role
of Congress would be far more crucial to sustain any use of penumbral, inci-
dental, ancillary, or merely useful executive or judicial power, excepting only
those incidental powers without which a fair-minded person would conclude
that either branch would be unable to discharge its express duties.
The difference in the outcome of specific cases under this standard would
often be considerable, surely, though arguably it would not necessarily be
overwhelming. Presumably, if pressed, the Supreme Court in BiVens might
still have reached the same result, by holding that it would be unable to de-
cide the case according to its article III duty and in accordance with the
fourth amendment if it were unable to award money damages. Yet, this ex-
ample illustrates an obvious and important difference in approach; it is at
least open to doubt whether the result would be the same under both ap-
proaches, especially to the extent that the Court did not deem itself at liberty
to innovate freely in the absence of supporting legislation by Congress.
The same can be said in respect to the President. The latitude of executive
privilege (or of executive orders, or of executive agreements) that the courts
might sustain absent affirmative legislation by Congress would surely be nar-
rower than it is now. Moreover, if a claim of executive privilege could be
defended on no higher ground than that it seems "reasonable" or "appro-
priate" as good policy, it would be clear to the courts that arguments of that
kind are solely for Congress to consider. The Court would likely have no
more to do with such arguments than when they come up in other cases
respecting the wisdom or need for legislative action. 4 '
The unmistakably "legislative" nature of the Supreme Court's efforts to
resolve the controversies in executive privilege cases leaves one with the un-
easy feeling that something is missing. There is, of course, no clause in the
Constitution that provides an express basis for a general claim of executive
privilege-nothing equivalent to the "speech and debate" clause in article
40. See note 50 infra and accompanying text.
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I 4 1-and thus executive claims cannot be tested for their sufficiency against
the language, location, relationship, or history of such a provision. The situa-
tion is far different in this respect even from the much-maligned decisions of
the Supreme Court respecting the open-textured phrases of "due process,"
"equal protection," or "privileges and immunities" of the fourteenth amend-
ment. In those cases, although it may be argued that the Court has sometimes
strained at the text or revised history with its own legislative intentions (as has
so often been suggested was true of Lochner v. New York, 42 for instance), the
criticism scarcely goes so deep as to insist that it is improper or purely
gratuitous for the Court to become involved at all. These clauses are there,
and they inevitably invite tests of their self-executing scope. The federal
courts surely do not act gratuitously by entertaining argument to determine
the protection such clauses may (or may not) provide. That necessity cannot
be pressed, however, in respect to the great variety of incidental power cases
the Court has been willing to consider. As a consequence, it is scarely surpris-
ing that their results strike one simply as "good," "bad," or "indifferent," but
in any event, as tested principally by one's notions of sound policy rather than
by anything approaching the more certain standards that judges, as distinct
from legislators, are supposed to use.
The reasoning of the executive privilege (and other incidental powers)
cases does not conform to a tight requirement that the Court be shown that a
highly specific privilege of executive secrecy or confidentiality is essential to the
exercise of some express article II duty or power. 43 Rather, more often than
not, the discussion within each case is framed in much larger terms scarcely
anchored (if anchored at all) in any clause or provision and with no serious
demonstration whatever of the circumstantial necessity for the incidental
power. The lack of any antecedent legislative expression compounding the
lack of any constitutional clause setting the basis for the power claimed, tends
to set the character of such judicial review afloat on its own "legislative" sea.
As a result, what one finds is at best a demonstration that the claimed inci-
dental power is determined to be useful to the office and that its probable
utility is not outweighed under the circumstances by the needs of another
41. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6, cl. 1. For a very recent application of this clause, see Eastland v.
United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
42. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Lochner was overruled in Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917), its
standards of judicial review were repudiated in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), it is
adjured in Ferguson v. Krupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) and in North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973)-and its standards are revived in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 34; Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and
the Return of the "Natural-Law-Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 716 (1969).
43. For example, the confidentiality of summit negotiations, as insisted upon by the other
nation, may be necessary in the course of the executive effort to "make" a treaty, without prej-
udice to the Senate's separate prerogative to ratify or to decline to do so without full disclosure of
all the circumstances before it acts.
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party for discovery 4 4-in the fashion that one would expect to find in the
rationale of a statute addressed to the question.
This sort of judicial review stands in marked contrast to that invoked in
reviewing the constitutionality of what Congress has already debated and re-
solved to be necessary and proper. In the latter case, the Court reviews a rule
already arrived at by a political body not to second guess the wisdom or the
general efficacy of the congressional product, but rather "merely" to ascertain
its constitutionality as the rule is drawn into actual controversy between an-
tagonistic litigants (one of whom may well be the President or his agent claim-
ing the benefit of that rule). The Court examines it for the limited purpose of
determining whether there is so little plausible connection between that rule
and any enumerated power of Congress that even after giving full deference
to Congress' discretion under the "necessary and proper" clause, the Court
cannot help but conclude against the validity of the act as unauthorized (or as
otherwise forbidden by the Bill of Rights).
The whole matter has taken on a different complexion, however, in the
usual judicial review of executive "implied" prerogatives. The inquiry is fre-
quently indistinguishable from an ordinary legislative debate, and the usual
resulting opinion is likely to read no more 'judicially" than a good congres-
sional committee report, because that is essentially what it is.
The case of Myers v. United States45 is a very good illustration of the prob-
lem (an illustration made even better because the case is nearly a half-century
old and not especially controversial just now). The issue confronting the
Court in the case was the extent of an implied executive removal power, and
more particularly, its efficacy against an act of Congress requiring the advice
and consent of the Senate for the removal of certain officials. The Taft opin-
ion is very long, nearly fifty pages, as were the dissents by McReynolds and
Brandeis (with a one-page dissent by Holmes), and overall the opinions in
M-yers are among the most elaborate and scholarly that have been issued in the
history of the Supreme Court.46 For our purposes, however, only a brief por-
tion of the Taft opinion need be considered.
Chief Justice Taft accepted as true that there were no powers vested in the
President other than those expressly granted in article II. He believed, how-
ever, that each express power carried in its train an uncertain number of
implied incidental powers. The executive supremacy of the President in
whom "the executive power" was vested, his responsibility to "take care that
the laws be faithfully executed," and his express power of nomination (and
shared power of appointment), Taft argued, implied an exclusive authority to
remove all executive officials at will.
44. An excellent illustration is Senate Select Comm. v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
45. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
46. The elaborate preparation of the case is described in E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S
REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION (Nat'l Municipal League Monograph Series 1927).
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At the highest level of executive subordinates, i.e., cabinet officers, Taft
had a very strong argument for the application of his view. He was able to
point out that in 1789, the very first Congress had held an extended debate
on a bill providing for a Department of Foreign Affairs and the appointment
of a Secretary of State. He observed that in the course of that debate, James
Madison, rightly considered the "father" of the Constitution, cautioned
against the use of any language in the bill that would imply Senate control
over the removal of a Secretary of State, as Madison thought any such impli-
cation would be both quite unwise and probably unconstitutional as an inva-
sion of exclusive presidential power. By a majority in the House and by a tie
in the Senate (broken by the vote of the Vice President), one or both of
Madison's arguments had carried the day in 1789. The bill that was adopted
avoided any language that might be read as implying a shared power in the
Senate to control the removal of the Secretary of State.
Taft's arguments were similarly compelling as he reviewed the later grand
debate concerning impeachment after President Andrew Johnson, contrary to
the Tenure of Office Act, 47 presumed to remove Secretary of War Stanton.
In respect to both incidents, the argument of an exclusive executive removal
power from implied necessity was a compelling one, despite the fact that the
original Convention Debates shed no light at all upon the question and the
Federalist Papers dealt with it only lightly, asserting that the power to remove,
like the power to appoint, would require the consent of the Senate. 48 Given
the President's own express duties in article II, an argument of presidential
removal power by necessity of the relationship of the parties is not at all un-
reasonable as to those office-holders who work in intimate association with
him at the cabinet level, discharging highly discretionary responsibilities at the
President's immediate direction and virtually as his alter ego. Considered in
light of these facts, the argument in favor of presidential executive supremacy
is compelling, so compelling that none of the dissents in Myers presumed to
take issue with the Chief Justice at this level.
The difficulty in Myers, however, was that the office in question was not of
this kind. At issue was the removal of Frank Myers, Postmaster of Portland,
Oregon, three thousand miles distant. Myers's term of service was fixed by
Congress at four years, and the President could in any case override his deci-
sions. Further, the President might even be able to suspend Myers should
exigent cause so persuade him. Yet, as one aspect of early civil service legisla-
tion clearly provided, Myers could not otherwise be removed outright without
the Senate's consent. Nevertheless, Chief Justice Taft concluded that, with or
without cause, with or without any suspension, hearing, or statement of
reason, the President had the exclusive power to remove Myers. Thus the
47. Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867).
48. See THE FEDERALIS-I" No. 77 (A. Hamilton).
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principle came to be established that, to this extent, the Constitution itself
enacted the power of an executive spoils system.
The weakness of the Taft opinion is displayed only after he makes his
very forceful case with respect to members of the President's own immediate
cabinet. From his argument that a removal power is truly indispensable to the
President at the highest level of executive relationship, he went on to say less
convincingly: "But this is not to say that there are not strong reasons why the
President should have a like power to remove his appointees charged with
other duties than those above described. '49 It is here, however, that fair-
minded persons are likely to agree that all such "reasons" fell far short of
executive necessity. Rather, they were for the most part simply arguments
that it might be well for Congress, even in providing for an overall civil ser-
vice system, to allow a limited exception enabling the President to intervene
and unilaterally remove any executive office-holder down through and below
the particular post held by Frank Myers.
The dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Myers is very long, at least as schol-
arly as that of Chief Justice Taft, and casts a great deal of doubt upon much
that the Chief Justice attempted to show. But the following excerpt from Mr.
Justice McReynold's dissent best makes the point in responding to the Chief
Justice's argument: "[I]t seems useless, if not, indeed, presumptuous, for
courts to discuss matters of supposed convenience or policy when considering
the President's power to remove."' 0 All such questions of expediency and
convenience are the stuff of the congressional process and not the business of
the judiciary in the exercise of constitutional review. The only reasoning that
could support the holding in Myers is that absent a total removal of authority
over the whole of the federal executive bureaucracy, the President would be
without an essential means to perform his duties. If this were so, the power
could be supported by reasoning that the power is implied according to one
or more of those express duties. Without that argument of necessity, however,
the judicial decision, like the brief argument for the President, could read no
better than a good committee report and recommendation for legislation.
That, however, is clearly not enough, since no committee had submitted such
a recommendation and no such legislation (readily sustainable pursuant to the
"necessary and proper" clause) had been adopted. This alone should have
been enough to yield a different holding, and the actual outcome of the case
was merely made worse by the additional fact that the only legislation appli-
cable to the controversy stood against the President's claim.
Myers has been an embarrassment to the Supreme Court ever since, I
think, although it has never been repudiated. The Court has trimmed it very
awkwardly by narrowing the definition of "executive" office and by insisting
49. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 135 (emphasis added).
50. 272 U.S. at 204.
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that the principal administrative agencies are "legislative" and 'judicial," but
somehow not significantly "executive. 5 1 Even so, this remains one of the
areas of Holmes-Brandeis dissents that has not come 'round. The signal diffi-
culty of Myers is that it "constitutionalized" a scope of executive removal
power that finds no expression at all in the Constitution, that is far from
being self-evidently necessary as a means for discharging any express execu-
tive power, and that Congress had not deemed necessary and proper pur-
suant to the second half of the sweeping clause in article I.
The meaning of the "necessary and proper" clause in reference to the role
of Congress and the amplification of executive power has been much ne-
glected, I believe, because so much of the original debate and so much of the
subsequent litigation of this clause were preoccupied with its vertical effect,
i.e., the extent to which the sweeping clause authorized congressional legisla-
tion in derogation of "states' rights," or in derogation of "personal liberties."5 2
There is no surprise in this preoccupation, of course. The central issues of
the day were those involving the uncertain consequences of amending the
Articles of Confederation to establish a new national government with a far
broader range of powers than those given to Congress under the Articles,
powers deemed potentially menacing to the states and to personal liberties in
the absence of a Bill of Rights.
Even so, some attention was given to the horizontal distribution of power
within the new national government about to be established, and the sweeping
clause is one of several that made Congress prinus inter pares. This view is
supported by the language of the full clause, its placement in article I, the
51. See Weiner v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958); Humphrey's Executor v. United States,
295 U.S. 602 (1935); cf. Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701
(1941). The shaky distinction may owe its success to Corwin's essay immediately following the
Myers case, although it is clear from the essay that Corwin thought that Myers itself was basically
unsound. E. CORWIN, supra note 46.
52. Characteristic of antifederalist objections to the sweeping clause were fears that (in con-
nection with the taxing power and/or the preamble to the proposed Constitution) it would readily
support acts of Congress completely displacing the authority of state legislatures. See THE
ANTIFEDERALIST PAPERS Nos. 17, 32, 33, 46 (M. Borden ed. 1965). For similar objections made in
the course of the Philadelphia Convention, see 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 632, 640 (M. Farrand ed. 191 1). For such objections made in the course of the Virginia
Debates (remarks by Randolph and Mason), see 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 442, 470 (2d ed. 1836). The back-
ground for these anxieties rested only in part upon the particular wording of the clause. The
potential range of the clause was feared also because the clause itself would displace the restric-
tive clause of the Articles of Confederation (article 11 provided: "Every state retains its
sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not
by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States in Congress Assembled") and be-
cause no similar restatement of states' rights (e.g., the tenth amendment) was provided for in the
proposed Constitution.
The most usual response to these criticisms was to deny that the sweeping clause would have so
free-ranging an effect as the critics supposed and to insist that were Congress to exceed its au-
thority under the clause, the Supreme Court (in an appropriate case) would declare such an act
of Congress to be void. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, supra at 443; THE FEDERALIST No. 33 (A. Hamilton).
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absence of any equivalent in articles II and 1II, occasional illustrations specifi-
cally given of its horizontal use, 53 and the common sense of the matter in
terms of function. As I have attempted to indicate above, and want now to
observe still again, the judiciary has ordinarily been awkward and uncomfort-
able in passing upon executive (and judicial) claims of ancillary authority
unsupported by acts of Congress. It has been rightly "awkward" not because such
claims cannot affect the President's business or the judiciary's business, for
clearly they can, but rather because the elements of judgment and com-
promise entailed in those claims are the very essence of political
judgment-the natural preserve of legislative determination.
53. See, e.g., 3 J. ELLiOT, supra note 52, at 463-64 (remarks by Governor Randolph). Ran-
dolph, a delegate to the Constitutional Convention, originally opposed ratification of the Con-
stitution (because of its omission of a Bill of Rights), but subsequetly urged its ratification in the
Virginia Convention, in which the debate was more extensive than in any other state convention.
In Randolph's view, advocates of ratification were disingenuous in asserting that the scope of
the "necessary and proper" clause was extremely limited (i.e., that the clause would enable Con-
gress only to legislate indispensable means of implementing each express power) because, in his
view, each enumeration of national power itself implied a grant of incidental power indispensable
to its execution. Thus, to regard the sweeping clause in that manner would be to reduce it to
"tautology." Rather, the clause would establish in Congress a wider discretion with respect to
means, albeit not an unlimited discretion-very much as John Marshall was to hold later in
United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358 (1804), and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). What is important is that Randolph thus acknowledged that a separate sub-
stantive power would be granted to Congress by the proposed sweeping clause; and he illustrated
his point not simply in reference to what the clause would enable Congress to do in respect to its
own enumerated powers, but specifically what it would enable Congress to grant to the President,
i.e., powers incidental to (and not simply indispensable in aid of) executing the enumerated ex-
ecutive powers.
See also 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 52, at 567-68 (emphasis added), in which Madison observed (in
his Report on the Virginia Resolution):
The plain import [of the sweeping clause] is, that Congress shall have all the incidental
or instrumental powers necessary and proper for carrying into execution all the express
powers, whether they be vested in the government of the United States, more collec-
tively, or in the several departments or officers thereof.
Whenever, therefore, a question arises concerning the constitutionality of a particular
power, the first question is, whether the power be expressed in the Constitution. If it be,
the question is decided. If it be not expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is
properly an incident to an express power, and necessary to its execution. If it be not
expressed, the next inquiry must be, whether it is properly an incident to an express
power, and necessary to its execution. If it be, it may be exercised by Congress. If it be
not, Congress cannot exercise it.
Compare this with Madison's observations about the clause in his discussion of an executive re-
moval power, id. at 379; and then with his observations about the clause in his discussion of the
incorporation of a national bank. Id. at 417-18. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the
Constitution, literally quotes the Madison interpretation from the Virginia Resolutions as a state-
ment of his own view of the sweeping clause. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION
ch. 24, § 1243 (1833).
The view that Governor Randolph was describing as disingenuous (because it sought to disarm
criticism of the sweeping clause by treating it as trivial or tautologous) was advanced by Hamilton
in The Federalist No. 33. For still another view that the latter half of the sweeping clause was
meant to operate as a restriction on the executive power, see I W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE
CONSTITUTION IN "HE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 381-83 (1953).
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Accordingly, when the best that can be said of a rule of executive or judi-
cial power-whether of confidentiality, removal, remedy, or some other-is
that its establishment may be appropriate and helpful to a branch, that it is
consistent with, albeit not essential to, its functions, then it may simply be one
more issue constitutionally committed to Congress to determine, either by pro-
viding for such a rule or by delegating a limited authority for the courts or
the executive to provide if for themselves. But provision of one kind or the
other must first be made by Congress. Correspondingly, the absence of affir-
mative action by Congress may defeat an assertion of ancillary executive or
judicial powers that cannot be defended as having been expressly provided in
articles II and III or as necessarily implied by the nature of the expressed
duties of those branches.
One might, of course, regard this as an heretical and "revisionist" treat-
ment of the constitutional principle of separated powers, as though, in the
aftermath of Watergate, it seeks excitedly for some way to describe a greater
executive dependency upon affirmative acts of Congress than scholarly de-
tachment can honestly condone. Yet, there is a marvelous irony in the fact
that the most famous judicial quotation respecting the importance of the
principle of separated powers was uttered not to show the independence of
broad implied executive powers, as one might think, but to show the very
opposite. The quotation is the following one: 4
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of
1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary
power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the inevitable
friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.
It is taken from Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissenting opinion in Myers, in which
he, Holmes, and McReynolds held against the claim of implied executive in-
dependence. What makes the quotation of even greater interest, moreover, is
that the Holmes-Brandeis position was not limited to the ground that in the
particular case Congress had affirmatively legislated against the executive
claim. It is clear from his full opinion that Mr. Justice Brandeis regarded the
second half (the "horizontal" half) of the "necessary and proper" clause as
requiring much more than the absence of congressional legislation against
such an assertion of expedient executive power. Rather, he read the clause as
saying that Congress was the judge of the need for such a power and would
itself have to provide for that power if the President were to have it at all.
Thus, Brandeis observed: "There is no express grant to the President of inci-
dental powers resembling those conferred upon Congress by clause 18 of Ar-
ticle I, § 8." " In elaborating the significance of that observation, Brandeis
54. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
55. 272 U.S. at 246.
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quoted approvingly the following views of John Calhoun, expressing himself a
century earlier in Congress:
51
Congress shall have power to make all laws, not only to carry into effect the
powers expressly delegated to itself, but those delegated to the Government,
or any department or office thereof; and of course comprehends the power
to pass laws necessary and proper to carry into effect the powers expressly
granted to the executive department. It follows, of course, to whatever ex-
press grant of power to the Executive the power of dismissal may be supposed
to attach, whether to that of seeing the law faithfully executed, or to the still
more comprehensive grant, as contended by some, vesting executive powers
in the President, the mere fact that it is a power appurtenant to another
power and necessary to carry it into effect, transfers it, by the provisions of
the Constitution cited, from the Executive to Congress ....
In short, the separation of powers to be respected is that which the Constitu-
tion itself establishes, including the sole power of Congress to determine and
to make provision for incidental (but not indispensable) powers that in its view
may promote greater efficiency in the executive or judicial branches. 57
56. Id., citing II CoxG. DEB. 553 (1835). See also McReynolds opinion, 272 U.S. at 179-81;
Holmes opinion, 272 U.S. at 177.
57. See also In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 81-83 (1890) (Lamar, J., dissenting) (emphasis added):
The Attorney General ... maintains . . . that the President ... is invested with necessary
and implied executive powers . . . that many of these . . . are self-executing, and in no
way dependent, except as to the ways and means, upon legislation.
In reply to these propositions. we have this to say .... [O]ne very prominent feature of
the Constitution which he [the President] is sworn to preserve, and which the whole
body of the judiciary are bound to enforce, is the closing paragraph of sec. 8, Art. 1, in
which it is declared that "the Congress shall have power ... to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any
department or officer thereof."
This clause is that which contains the germ of all the implication of powers under the
Constitution. . . . And that clause alone, conclusively refutes the assertion of the Attor-
ney General ....
This was, to be sure, a part of the dissent-and in its later briefs in United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) and in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
the executive sought to derive from the majority exactly the opposite conclusion. Yet, while there
are indeed broad dicta in the majority opinion, 135 U.S. at 64-65, as there are also such dicta in
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), the majority held only that, in its view (contrary to the view of
the dissent), specific acts of Congress did themselves authorize the executive action involved in
the case: "But there is positive law [i.e., a specific act of Congress] investing the marshals and
their deputies with powers which not only justify what Marshal Neagle did in this matter, but
which imposed it upon him as a duty." 135 U.S. at 68.
The dissent in In re Neagle allowed for a single exception to the proposition that Congress
must by statute first make provision for an implied or incidental executive power: namely, in
meeting extraterritorial international incidents for which Congress may have made no provision.
135 U.S. at 84-85. In that respect, the dissent in In re Neagle carries through a dictum by Chief
Justice Marshall in Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 176 (1804) (in which the holding,
however, was that as Congress had anticipated the situation and had, by statute, marked the
boundary of permissible executive action, presidential action in excess of the act of Congress was
of no effect and could not serve even to insulate a naval captain who relied in good faith on the
executive order from liability for money damages).
The possibility of greater executive discretion in external affairs, even in the absence of en-
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There is, moreover, nothing in this that is peculiarly "anti-Watergate," or
even "anti-executive." As Brandeis observed in Myers, it would affect claims of
implied judicial power with equal force. Indeed, most of the early illustrations
and uses of the horizontal effect of the sweeping clause related to the
judiciary rather than to the executive. One of these is an early decision of the
Supreme Court concerning the contempt power. It was held that while the
federal judiciary might have inherent power to impose contempt sanctions for
misconduct that threatened the ability of a court to perform its express article
III judicial duties, any further reach of judicial contempt power, no matter
how generally helpful to the courts or logically conducive to the protection of
the national government, must depend strictly upon Congress affirmatively
providing for it. 5 8 Thus, just as a more literal fidelity to the full sweeping
clause in article I (and the more notable absence of any equivalent provision
in articles I or III) may result in a far more skeptical judical treatment of the
expanse of implied executive powers, so also may it bear upon the judi-
ciary-e.g., in respect to "supervisory" authority and as to the scope of con-
tempt, rule-making, confidentiality, or removal powers.
II
A CLOSER LOOK AT UNITED STATES V. NIxoN
United States v. Nixon 5 9 is the most recent case that provides an occasion to
show the manner in which the horizontal effect of the sweeping clause might
abling legislation by Congress, carries on through United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299
U.S. 304 (1936). See Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973). Writing of the Curtiss-Wright case in Youngstown Sheet & Tube
v. Sawyer, Mr. Justice Jackson declared:
That case does not solve the present controversy. It recognized internal and external
affairs as being in separate categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congres-
sional delegations of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with
respect to delegation of power in external affairs. It was intimated that the President
might act in external affairs without congressional authority ....
343 U.S. at 636 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
58. The United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). See also Marshall v. Gordon,
243 U.S. 521 (1917); Exparte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
204 (1821); Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "Infe-
rior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1022 (1924) ("[a]s an
incident to their being, courts must have the authority 'necessary in a strict sense' to enable them to
go on with their work") (emphasis added). In Anderson v. Dunn, the Court described the scope of
an inherent congressional power of contempt, a5 an indispensable power to enable the legislature
to perform its duties, as "the least possible power adequate to the end proposed." 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) at 231. Similarly, dissenting in Myers, Brandeis said: "A power implied on the ground
that it is inherent in the executive, must, according to established principles of constitutional
construction, be limited to 'the least possible power adequate to the end proposed.' " 272 U.S. at
246-47. For the most recent Supreme Court decision respecting the judicial contempt power
(which has, for a long time, been regulated by statute), see United States v. Wilson, 421 U.S. 309
(1975).
59. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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have been (but was not) applied. "Nowhere in the Constitution," the Court
noted, "is there any explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to
the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President's pow-
ers, it is constitutionally based."'6" That was so, in the Court's view, because
"[c]ertain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated
powers;' 6 the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications
has similar constitutional underpinnings.""
There is an opaqueness in these spare passages by Chief Justice Burger
that is frankly not dispelled by the balance of the opinion. Insofar as one
might suppose that footnote 16 would indicate the "enumerated powers" of
the President in article II from which the Court believed that executive
privilege did flow, the footnote is altogether disappointing. What it says is
this:
62
The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the Constitu-
tion for a Presidential privilege as to the President's communications corre-
sponding to the privilege of Members of Congress under the Speech or De-
bate Clause. But the silence of the Constitution on this score is not dispositive.
"The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in McCulloch v. Maryland
• ..that that which was reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of a
granted power was to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so
universally applied that it suffices merely to state it." ...
In the context of the whole opinion, these passages seem to suggest the
following propositions. First, John Marshall's historic opinion in McCulloch v.
MarYland sets the proper tone respecting the generous construction of ex-
press, enumerated, national powers to ensure that the Constitution is equal to
the vicissitudes of time and the great uncertainties of the future. It is "a
Constitution we are expounding,"'6 3 is the most durable of all Marshall's
memorable aphorisms; a wizened, cramped, penal-code style of judicial con-
struction would be a profound (or ludicrous) mistake. Second, although
McCulloch v. Maryland itself may have considered only the latitude of congres-
sional power (which is, of course, expressly complemented by the "necessary
and proper" clause, upon which Marshall relied to confirm his view of gener-
ous construction), the pertinence of his view of generous construction is self-
evident in respect to the express enumerated powers of the President as well.
The executive branch must have its constitutional powers construed with the
utmost judicial latitude to be equal to the demands that an uncertain future
might impose upon that branch (and upon the judicial branch), as well as
upon Congress. Third, although the Court did not bother to indicate by name
any enumerated executive power, whatever incidental executive power might
60. 418 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added).
61. 418 U.S. at 705-06.
62. Id. n.16 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
63. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
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be "reasonably appropriate and relevant to the exercise of [an enumerated
executive] power [is] considered as accompanying the grant."6 4 A general
privilege of executive confidentiality may obviously be "reasonably appro-
priate and relevant" to the President in respect to each of his enumerated
executive powers, and correspondingly both its existence and scope call "for
great deference from the courts."
That the latitude of incidental ancillary executive powers was deemed by
the Court to be the same as the latitude of Congress pursuant to the "neces-
sary and proper" clause itself seems evident simply from a comparison of
language. Writing of Congress and of the sweeping clause in McCulloch v.
Maryland, Marshall had rejected the stringent construction ("absolutely neces-
sary" and "indispensably necessary") and finally concluded: "Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which
are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohi-
bited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are consti-
tutional."6
In United States v. Nixon, the Court, footnoting to McCulloch its statements
about implied executive powers incidental to enumerated ones, found that
whatever "relates to the effective discharge"66---i.e., whatever may efficiently
aid, be logically conducive in connection with, or be expedient in the accom-
plishment of (and without the felt judicial necessity even to specify which)
enumerated executive powers-is implied by article II.
For reasons I have now tried to explain (none of which were briefed in
the case, addressed in the opinion, or suggested in the many writings on
United States v. Nixon), however, I think that the supposed equivalence be-
tween the latitude of Congress' incidental initiatives and those of the execu-
tive, suggested as dicta in Nixon, is very doubtful. Moreover, it does not at all
follow from Marshall's views in McCulloch v. Maryland, either in textual ex-
egesis or in wise and generous policy.
The latitude of legislative power vested in Congress by the sweeping
clause, as generously construed by Marshall, fully assures the constitutional
authority of the national government to meet evolving circumstances. Insofar
as the judiciary and the executive may be aided by the equipage of ancillary
powers "reasonably appropriate and relevant" to their assigned constitutional
tasks, the equipage can be provided. The Constitution does not forestall or
prevent that development. Rather, it provides for that development, exactly as
suggested by Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, by enabling Congress to pro-
vide any such merely expedient incidental judicial and executive powers as the
courts or the President shall thereafter request.
64. United States %. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
65. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
66. 418 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added).
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Fuller excerpts from Marshall's opinion, moreover, reflect his own em-
phasis on Congress:6 7
[T]he constitution of the United States has not left the right of congress to
employ the necessary means, for the execution of the powers conferred on the
government, to general reasoning. To its enumeration of powers is added that
of making "all laws which shall be necessary and proper, for carrying into
execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitu-
tion, in the government of the United States, or in any department thereof."
... This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to
come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.
To have prescribed the means by which government should, in all future
time, execute its powers, would have been to change, entirely, the character of
the instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would have been
an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if
foreseeen at all, must have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided
for as they occur....
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are lim-
ited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound con-
struction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion,
with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into
execution . . . . Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted
to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.
The reliance by Marshall on the sweeping clause itself; rather than upon a
more general rule of construction that powers granted and enumerated in
each article were to be treated as carrying in their train a large number of
merely "appropriate," incidental powers, is not limited to his opinion in this
case. Fifteen years earlier, in United States v. Fisher, he set the tone for
McCulloch by construing the sweeping clause and the latitude of discretion it
established for Congress :68
[Ilt has been truly said, that under a constitution conferring specific powers,
the power contended for must be granted, or it cannot be exercised....
. . . It is claimed, under the authority to make all laws which shall be
necessary and proper to carry into execution the powers vested by the con-
stitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or
officer thereof....
... In construing this clause it would be incorrect, and would produce end-
less difficulties, if the opinion should be maintained, that no law was au-
thorized which was not indispensably necessary to give effect to a specified
power....
... Where various systems might be adopted for that purpose, it might be
said, with respect to each, that it was not necessary, because the end might be
obtained by other means. Congress must possess the choice of means, and
must be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the
exercise of a power granted by the constitution.
67. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 411-12, 415, 421 (emphasis added).
68. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 358, 396 (1804) (emphasis added).
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To be sure, each of these cases involved the use of the sweeping clause to
sustain an act of Congress in aid of a power enumerated in article I itself. But
Marshall also relied exclusively on the same clause as the necessary source of
authority-i.e., a legislative authority-to provide for a rule-making power in
the judiciary. In Wayman v. Southard,6 9 the question before the Court was
whether rules established by the federal courts respecting the manner in
which execution of federal court judgments would be levied by United States
Marshals could prevail over conflicting rules established by a state. Interest-
ingly, Marshall did not find such authority as one vested in the courts by force
of article III as an incident of the judicial power, in spite of the fact that
clearly the manner in which a federal court judgment might be carried into
effect pertains immediately to the judicial business. Further, although encour-
aged by plaintiff's counsel to do so, Marshall did not find the source of con-
gressional power to aid the courts in the language of article IIl." Rather, he
located the authority of the federal courts so to provide for such rules solely
in an act of Congress, which act, in turn, he found to be authorized solely on
the basis of the second half of the sweeping clause:7"
The constitution concludes its enumeration of granted powers, with a clause
authorizing congress to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by
this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof. The judicial department is invested with jurisdiction
in certain specified cases, in all which it has power to render judgment.
That a power to make laws for carrying into execution all the judgments
which the judicial department has power to pronounce, is expressly conferred
by this clause, seems to be one of those plain propositions which reasoning
cannot render plainer. The terms of the clause neither require nor admit of
elucidation. The court, therefore, will only say, that no doubt whatever is
entertained on the power of congress over the subject. The only inquiry is,
how far has this power been exercised?
Wayman v. Southard is made even more significant by the manner in which
Marshall responded to the second issue in the case. This was the contention
of the defendants that, assuming Congress could provide rules specifying the
manner in which federal court judgments were to be executed (and that it
could do so pursuant to the sweeping clause), Congress could not delegate the
power to the courts so to provide. That, in the defendants' view, would consti-
tute a delegation of legislative power to a nonlegislative branch in contraven-
69. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
70. ".... such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish ....
The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such excep-
tions, and under such regulations as the Congress shall make." U.S. CONST. art. Ill, §§ 1, 2.
71. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 22 (emphasis added). For similar reliance upon congressional au-
thorization pursuant to the sweeping clause see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965);
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883); Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721
(1838); Bank of U.S. v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53-54 (1825).
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tion of the requirement in article I that "all legislative Powers herein granted
shall be vested in a Congress,' 72 and thus must be exercised by Congress itself.
What is interesting about Marshall's response is its explicit assumption that
indeed the power being exercised is exclusively a legislative one, i.e., a power
solely to be exercised by Congress. Although the power clearly pertained to
the judicial business and was, in fact, very intimate to that business, determin-
ing what practical effect would be given to a federal court judgment, Marshall
relied on that connection only to show why, under these circumstances, Con-
gress could by statute grant to the courts a limited rule-making power of their
own without thereby being guilty of an unconstitutional delegation. His con-
cern with this issue would appear to make no sense at all if one were to
assume that the courts already possessed an incidental rule-making power of
their own that the act of Congress merely confirmed. Rather, Marshall dis-
cussed the delegation issue as a deeply troublesome one, and he found the
federal court power valid because (a) it was clearly provided for by Congress,
and (b) it was provided for in respect to something clearly intimate to the
operation of the federal judiciary. Thus, he finally concluded: 73
The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important sub-
jects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of
less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to
those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details.
The assumption seems very clear that though the power pertained intimately
to the judicial business, it must be given by Congress to be exercised at all (be-
cause the sweeping clause so requires). When Congress gives it, moreover (as
distinguished from itself legislating the particular rule), it may do so only in
respect to less important subjects and "under such general provisions to fill
up the details." A broader delegation would violate the requirement of the
sweeping clause that Congress alone is to say to what extent and in what
manner the judicial power is to be aided in securing the execution of its
judgments.
Wayman v. Southard was written in 1825, six years after Marshall's opinion
in McCulloch v. Maryland. In between, just a few months after McCulloch, Mar-
shall had penned a series of anonymous essays in response to newspaper at-
tacks written by two well-known judges, Spencer Roane and William Brocken-
brough, in his home state of Virginia.7 4 Most of the exchange among the
three was, understandably, directed to what the Virginia judges regarded as
the unwarranted breadth of the construction Marshall had given the sweeping
clause in McCulloch, Roane and Brockenbrough attacking it as an end to
72. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1 (emphasis added).
73. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 43 (emphasis added).
74. See G. GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF McCulloch v. Maryland (1969).
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federalism and as a means of nationalizing all power in disparagement of the
tenth amendment.
75
In answering them, Marshall gave examples of the manner in which the
sweeping clause was immensely important-not only in its vertical effect, but
also in its horizontal operation. And, as in Wayman, the discussion would
make little sense (if any at all) if Marshall believed that the courts, on their
own initiative, could have presumed to assume incidental powers that Mar-
shall locates as the very function of the sweeping clause to provide through
Congress :76
The power [of Congress in article III] is to ordain and establish inferior
courts, the judges of which shall hold their offices during good behavior, and
receive as a compensation for their services, salaries which shall not be di-
minished during their continuance in office. The second section [in article
III] defines the extent of the judicial power.
Is a law to punish those who falsify a [judicial] record, one without which
a court cannot exercise its functions? We know that under the confederation
Congress had the power to establish, and did establish certain courts, and had
not the power to pass laws for the punishment of those who should falsify its
records.-Unquestionably such a law is "needful," "requisite," "essential,"
"conducive to," the due administration of justice; but no man can say it is one
without which courts cannot decide causes, or without which it is physically
impossible for them to perform their functions. According to the rule of Am-
phyction [Judge Brockenbrough] then, such a law cannot be enacted by Con-
gress, but may be enacted by the state legislatures.
Again, the explicit assumption is that the sweeping clause is the important
clause exactly because, unless it is granted the construction Marshall has given
to it, there is no national power at all to provide for things "conducive to" the
judicial business. Thus, the courts could not themselves so provide-but
Congress may, either directly or by a limited delegation to the courts as in
Wayman.
In a subsequent essay in response to Roane, Marshall again emphasized
the separate importance of the sweeping clause as the proper source of na-
75. In view of the fact that Brockenbrough and Roane insisted that the sweeping clause would
enable Congress to adopt only such legislation as might be indispensably necessary (as distinct
from appropriate and convenient) in the execution of Congress' own enumerated powers, making
the clause virtually redundant of each such power, it is interesting to note how very limited a
construction they also gave to its horizontal effect. They concluded that perhaps the clause's sole
function was to permit Congress to provide for (indispensably) necessary incidental powers to the
executive and to the judiciary:
The clause then conveys no grant of powers; it was inserted from abundant caution, or
perhaps for the purpose of letting in the power contained in the latter part of the clause,
and of vesting in the legislature rather than the other departments the power of making
laws to carry into effect the "other powers vested in the government, or in any depart-
ment or officer thereof."
Id. at 70.
76. Id. at 99.
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tional power (a congressional power), to provide all incidental means of ren-
dering the judicial power fully effective:7 7
Thus too congress has power "to constitute tribunals inferior to the su-
preme court."
An act constituting these tribunals, defining their jurisdiction, regulating
their proceedings, &c. is not an incident to the power, but the means of ex-
ecuting it.-The legislature may multiply or diminish these tribunals, may
vary their jurisdiction at will. These laws are means, and the constitution
creates no question respecting their necessity. But a law to punish those who
falsify a record, or who commit a perjury or subornation of perjury, is an
execution of an incidental power; and the question whether that incident is
fairly deduced from the principal, is open to argument. Under the confedera-
tion congress could establish certain courts; but, having no incidental powers,
was incapable of punishing those who falsified the records, or committed per-
jury within those courts.
In the exercise of an incidental power, we are always to enquire whether
"it appertains to or follows the principal"; for the power itself may be ques-
tioned; but in exercising one that is granted, there is no question about the
power, and the very business of a legislature is to select the means.
This, then, seems to me to connect very naturally and well with Mr. Justice
Jackson's dictum in Youngstown, and so to apply with at least equal force to the
executive branch as to the judicial branch: "With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences, men have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law, and that the law be
made by parliamentary deliberations."7 " Chief Justice Burger may therefore
have erred in United States v. Nixon, misreading McCulloch as though it spoke
at large to some implied "necessary and proper" clause in articles II and III,
conferring an incidental authority equally upon the executive and judiciary,
when in fact that powerful case stressed the national indispensability of the
clause solely in terms of what it enables Congress to do. In the absence of
provision by Congress, then, as Brandeis subsequently implied in Myers v.
United States, each companionate branch of the national government may as-
sert on its own only such incidental authority constituting "the least adequate
power"7 9 without which the executive or judiciary would be unable to dis-
charge the express article II and article III duties constitutionally assigned
them.
Additionally, insofar as a given kind or degree of executive or judicial
equipage can at best be said to be an eminently reasonable and efficient inci-
dent in aid of an executive or judicial power--e.g., the authorization of a
general "supervisory" authority over the inferior federal judiciary to be vested
in the Supreme Court-it strikes one as exactly the kind of issue appro-
77. Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
78. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis added).
79. See note 58 supra.
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priately addressed in the first instance to the discretion and debate of political
and legislative choice, i.e., to Congress. Under these circumstances, it may at
best be gratuitous (and at worst unconstitutional) for the Supreme Court itself
to presume to be the forum to resolve the arguments in favor of such powers.
Accordingly, a claim of executive (or judicial) privilege that can stand on
no firmer footing than that such privilege might be "reasonably appropriate"
in light of the President's or the federal courts' constitutional duties should be
held to require a basis in some supporting or some authorizing act of
Congress-the branch designated by article I to decide such questions. Only
when the particular assertion of privilege can fairly be said to be the least
adequate power a President (or a federal court) clearly must have to perform
express duties enumerated in the Constitution can the claim of privilege be
said to stand on its own constitutional ground when it wholly lacks affirmative
congressional authorization or enactment.
In this light, incidentally, it was not wrong of Alexander Bickel to have
disappointed his clients in the Pentagon Papers case by emphasizing the lack of
congressional authorization to the executive and to the courts at least equally
with the additional first amendment issues presented in that case. The point
was not lost on some of the Justices:"'
The Government does not even attempt to rely on any act of Congress. In-
stead, it makes the bold and dangerously far-reaching contention that the
courts should take it upon themselves to "make" a law abridging freedom of
the press in the name of equity, presidential power and national security,
even when the representatives of the people in Congress have adhered to the
command of the First Amendment and refused to make such a law.
At least in the absence of legislation by Congress, based on its own inves-
tiga'tions and findings, I am quite unable to agree that the inherent powers of
the Executive and the courts reach so far as to authorize remedies having
such sweeping potential for inhibiting publications by the press.81
It may be more convenient for the Executive Branch if it need only
convince a judge to prohibit conduct rather than ask the Congress to pass law,
and it may be more convenient to enforce a contempt order than to seek a
criminal conviction in a jury trial. Moreover, it may be considered politically
wise to get a court to share the responsibility for arresting those who the
Executive Branch has probable cause to believe are violating the law. But con-
venience and political considerations of the moment do not justify a basic
departure from the principles of our system of government. 82
There is, moreover, no statute barring the publication by the press of the
material which the Times and Post seek to use. ...
80. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 718 (1971) (Black, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 732 (White, J., concurring).
82. Id. at 742-43 (Marshall, J.. concurring).
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So any power that the Government possesses must come from its "inher-
ent power."'83
Finally, to the suggestion that alleged emergencies or the occurrences of con-
tingencies so exotic that Congress might not fairly be expected to have antici-
pated them might result in a national handicap, Mr. Justice Jackson's re-
sponse is still well worth recalling:
8 4
The appeal .. . that we declare the existence of inherent powers ex necessi-
tate to meet an emergency asks us to do what many think would be wise,
although it is something the forefathers omitted. They knew what emergen-
cies were, knew the pressures they engender for authoritative action, knew,
too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may also suspect that
the), suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies.
Aside from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of
rebellion or invasion. when the public safety may require it, they made no ex-
press provision for exercise of extraordinary authority because of a crisis....
... [E]mergency powers are consistent with free government only when
their control is lodged elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them.
That is the safeguard that would be nullified by our adoption of the "inher-
ent powers" formula. Nothing in my experience convinces me that such risks
are warranted by any real necessity, although such powers would, of course,
be an executive convenience.
In the practical working of our Government we already have evolved a
technique within the framework of the Constitution by which normal execu-
tive powers may be considerably expanded to meet an emergency. Congress
may and has granted extraordinary authorities which lie dormant in normal
times but may be called into play by the Executive in war or upon proclama-
tion of a national emergency....
In view of the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can grant
and has granted large emergency powers, certainly ample to embrace this
crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the argument that we should affirm pos-
session of them without statute. Such power either has no beginning or it has
no end....
AN ANTICLIMACTIC CONCLUSION
In attempting to explicate a general constitutional requirement of con-
gressional acts to provide for incidental judicial power conducive (but not
essential) to performance of the Court's duties as described in article III, I
provided several examples. In respect to one of these-viz., the scope of an
incidental contempt power-the cases generally conform to what has been
suggested: Anything broader than a power deemed indispensable to enable a
court to proceed with a given case appears to require statutory support. On
the other hand, in the example taken from Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
83. Id. at 720, 722 (Douglas, J., concurring).
84. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. at 649-50, 652-53 (Jackson, J., concur-
ring).
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Agents, 5 no act of Congress furnished the basis for the particular remedy (of
money damages), and neither did the Court hold that in the circumstances of
the case, no lesser remedy would have been consistent with the duty of the
Court to decide the case consistently with the fourth amendment. In spite of
appearances to the contrary, moreover, a case like Bivens is in this respect
more troublesome than many others in which the remedy that was fashioned
gave rise to enormous public uproar. The remedy in Swarm v. Charlotte-
Mecklenberg Board of Education,8 6 for instance, was an extraordinary judicial
order, incorporating a complex desegregation plan requiring continuing judi-
cial oversight and monitoring that still continues. Yet, there is this difference:
in Swann, not only could plaintiffs establish jurisdiction in a federal court to
hear the case in the first instance by force of an act of Congress8 7 (as was true
also in Bivens) s8 but they could also point to a separate act of Congress au-
thorizing the court to grant virtually any appropriate remedy.8 9 To be sure,
the manner in which the statutory authorization to provide equitable relief
was construed in Swann was felt by many to go to the very verge of judicial
discretion,9" but it was nonetheless true that the remedy was most im-
mediately anchored in the authorization of that statute. Indeed, this left it
somewhat uncertain whether such varieties of desegregation decrees would be
regarded as constitutionally indispensable, rather than merely appropriate
and not forbidden, inviting the abortive effort by President Nixon to per-
suade Congress to adopt an antibusing moratorium act.9'
Would it be correct to say, then, that money damages ought not have been
provided in Bivens absent a specific act of Congress authorizing them, unless
the Court was willing to hold that nothing less than money damages would
permit it to fulfill its judicial duty to vindicate Webster Bivens's fourth
amendment rights? If the provision of not-indispensable remedies can best be
characterized as a merely "appropriate" incidental power of the courts, the
conclusion certainly seems to follow from the argument developed above as to
85. See text at note 37 supra.
86. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
87. 23 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
89. Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, or any State or Territory. subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1970) which explicidy directs the district court
to utilize common law remedies insofar as "the laws of the United States . . . are not adapted to
the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies.
90. But see Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
91. See Bickel, What's Wrong With Nixon's Buising Bills?, 166 NEW REPUBLIC no. 17, at 19, 21
(1972).
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the role of Congress under the second half of the "necessary and proper"
clause. 92
Yet, one cannot be at all confident about such an outcome, for even with-
out holding that the particular remedy must be deemed indispensable9 3 to the
case over which the Court had jurisdiction, a bevy of softer alternatives will
readily occur to the thoughtful reader.9 4 Insofar as the remedy of money
damages is itself the single most common remedy of all and of most long-
standing availability within the judicial process, a court might well reason that
in the absence of a statute forbidding such a remedy in a particular kind of
case, it is to be assumed that Congress acquiesces in its use by the fact of its
silence. Alternatively, and still relying on the commonplace nature of money
damage remedies, a court might construe the jurisdictional statute empower-
ing the federal courts to hear the case as itself implying a grant of jurisdiction
to afford that kind of remedy, treating the power to award this remedy sim-
ply as a "lesser-included" power within the power to decide, rather than as an
"implied" or "incidental" power. Indeed, with all its provisions for writs, even
the original Judiciary Act of 178995 spoke with no great explicitness to money
damage remedies, and yet no serious question seems to have been entertained
as to their availability. Rather, contrary to what a layman might think, i.e., that
insofar as 'jurisdiction" might contemplate merely a power to determine the
rights and obligations of the parties, but to do no more than that, it is familiar
learning that the rendering of a merely declaratory judgment, in contrast with
a judgment contemplating money damages, was a remedy deemed so novel as
to require an authorizing act of Congress.96
My point in raising these matters, however, is not to solve them but to
establish that even should the Supreme Court be persuaded to read the
sweeping clause in article I with the fuller force I have urged in this brief
essay, it will make very little difference if nothing else is altered in the prac-
92. Bnt see Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) (emphasis added): "[W]here federally pro-
tected rights have been invaded, it has been the rulefrom the beginning that courts will be alert to
adjust their remedies so as to grant the necessary relief."
93. The concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in Bivens suggests that the money damage
remedy might well have been deemed indispensable in the facts of the case: "[I]t is apparent that
some form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position." 403
U.S. 388, 409-10 (1971).
94. Again, the concurring opinion by Mr. Justice Harlan in Bivens very carefully reviews sev-
eral bases according to which the Court might properly infer the availability of the remedy from
acts of Congress plus the ordinary nature of the remedy itself (as a general matter), the past
practice of the Court in analogous circumstances, and the lack of affirmative congressional re-
striction. See id. at 402-06.
95. Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 3.
96. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). Compare Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911)(suggesting that a judgment doing nothing more than to declare the legal rights and obligations
of the parties may not amount to a "case" or "controversy" within the judicial power as described
in article III of the Constitution), with Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288
U.S. 249 (1933); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
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tice of the Court. Indeed, unless the Court takes more seriously the whole
range of techniques it has invoked in behalf of the executive, if not in behalf
of itself, reliance upon any particular view of any particular clause would be
utterly naive.
Even if it were agreed that no purely ancillary executive power not indis-
pensable to the discharge of an express executive duty can be exercised with-
out congressional authorization, pursuant to the sweeping clause, there would
remain an endless number of ways of making that point an utterly trivial one.
Here, again, are but a few of them as applied specifically to the President:
1. By construing each express executive power with such breadth as to
yield the conclusion that what the President claimed in the case at hand was
really just a "lesser-included" rather than an "incidental," "implied," or ancil-
lary power;
2. by reviving the claim that in vesting "the executive power of the United
States" in a President, the text of article 1I is different in character from that
in article I (which vests only "all legislative Powers herein granted" in Congress)
and that, accordingly, the President possesses some executive powers nowhere
granted by the Constitution itself at all; 97
3. by insisting that an incident of executive power is in fact indispensable
(and not merely appropriate) to the effective exercise of an express executive
power, as Chief Justice Taft presumed to do in Myers;
4. by declaring that the mere passivity of Congress in the face of repeated
executive action of a given kind amounts to authorization by acquiescence, as
the Court did in Midwest Oil;98
5. by construing some act of Congress so broadly as to find within it the
authorization the sweeping clause may require, as did the majority in In Re
Neagle;99
6. by requiring so little of Congress in authorizing the President to provide
his own rules (and yet not hold that Congress has so far abdicated as to have
made an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power) as to encourage the
very worst tendencies in Congress itself; and
7. by invoking discretionary doctrines to favor the executive power by
97. But cf. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579, 641 (1952): "I cannot accept the view that this clause is a grant in bulk of all conceiv-
able executive power but regard it as an allocation to the presidential office of the generic powers
thereafter stated." See also Corwin, supra note 32, at 53:
The opening clause of Article I1 of the Constitution reads: "The executive Power shall
be vested in a President of the United States of America." The records of the Constitu-
tional Convention make it clear that the purposes of this clause were simply to settle the
question whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to give the execu-
tive a title.
98. United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See also Saxbe v. Bustos, 419 U.S.
65, 87-88 n. 12 (1974) (White, J., dissenting, sharply limiting and distinguishing Midwest Oil).
99. 135 U.S. 1 (1890). See also In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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foreclosing judicial review-e.g., pro-executive uses of "justiciability," "ripe-
ness," "standing," and of the power to deny certiorari.
In short, one's interest in a particular clause of the Constitution obviously
ought not to be exaggerated. That interest cannot be torn loose from a
broader perspective of the role of the Supreme Court in arresting the drift
of power within the national government.
When one concludes a foray into Farrand, Elliot, Madison's Notes, The
Federalist Papers, The Anti-Federalist Papers, the Ratification Debates, the early
annals of Congress, and the early cases, even the narrow subject of one's in-
terest is, in this instance, left to reasonable differences of opinion. °0 0 More-
over, if one sees the larger problem simply as whether Congress could, by
adequately asserting itself, readily restore what many might now agree to be
a better balance within the national government, there is really no reason to
be concerned at all with the "right" construction of the sweeping clause. In
answering the question as to what is left to Congress under the Constitution
even after one has generously accounted for all plausible powers of the Presi-
dent, for instance, Professor Charles Black has quite rightly observed:' 0 '
100. There are at least three views of the clause for which some support can be mustered,
and at least two additional interpretations would also be consistent with its language. Briefly, the
possibilities include at least all of the following:
I. Whether or not an assertion of incidental power by the President may be indispensable to his
execution of a specific, enumerated executive power, the President may not act in the absence of
authorization by Congress pursuant to this clause.
2. The President has the same latitude of discretion in electing among appropriate means to
discharge his enumerated powers as Congress has in respect to its powers, but Congress may, by
law, restrict the President short of taking from him such means as are indispensable to the per-
formance of his enumerated powers.
3. The enumeration of separate executive powers in article II implies as well such incidental or
lesser included powers as may be indispensable to their discharge by the President. A claim of
executive power that can stand on no firmer footing than that it would be an efficient or appro-
priate power in aid of some express executive power, however, must rest upon some supporting
act of Congress. It is for Congress to determine whether such power is necessary and proper.
4. This clause means only that insofar as the President may, as a practical matter, need the
assistance of Congress "to carry into execution" something the President might wish to do, Con-
gress may provide that assistance (e.g., by appropriating money).
5. This clause means only that insofar as making a law would itself be a necessary or proper
means of reinforcing the executive will (e.g., by criminalizing a breach of executive confidential-
ity), Congress has the power to make such a law.
The first construction finds some support in the position represented by Judges Brocken-
brough and Roane in their essay exchange with John Marshall following McCulloch v. Maryland
and, to a lesser extent, in the dissent in In re Neagle. See notes 74-76 and 56 supra. The fourth
and fifth constructions are certainly compatible with the language of the sweeping clause, and the
third construction is the one advanced in this brief essay. Interestingly, the second construction
(which best approximates the conventional view of the clause) seems by far the least compatible
with the language of the clause itself-for all that may matter.
Lest the mild intention of this essay be misunderstood, incidentally, there is (in my view) no
sufficient evidence of any one "original understanding" of the sweeping clause as to foreclose a
large measure of wholly legitimate judicial discretion in its interpretation.
101. Black, The Working Balance of the American Political Departments, I HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
13, 15-16 (1974).
ROLE OF CONGRESS
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The answer is just about everything. The powers of Congress are adequate
to the control of every national interest of any importance, including all those
with which the president might, by piling inference on inference, be thought
to be entrusted. And underlying all the powers of Congress is the appropria-
tions power, the power that brought the kings of England to heel. My classes
think I am trying to be funny when I say that, by simple majorities, Congress
could at the start of any fiscal biennium reduce the president's staff to one
secretary for answering social correspondence, and that, by two-thirds ma-
jorities, Congress could put the White House up at auction. But I am not
trying to be funny; these things are literally true, and the illustrations are
useful for marking the limits-or the practical lack of limits-on the power of
Congress over the president. Last year, in an appropriations bill, they told
him to stop bombing Cambodia by August 15, and he stopped. If the will had
existed, they could have done much the same thing four, or six or eight tragic
years ago-at any time they really had wanted.
From this point of view, the low estate of Congress is due only to its own lack
of energy and owes little, if anything, to the manner in which the federal
courts have favored claims of executive power during the past five decades. It
is a sobering suggestion, and perhaps it is wholly correct.
On the other hand, if one is inclined to see the problem less in terms of
what Congress might do consistent with its constitutional power and more in
terms of a role for the judiciary in insisting upon what Congress is responsible
for doing if such things are to be at all-e.g., going into a full scale war, as
distinct from finally cutting off its last, pathetic conclusion-the emphasis will
be quite different. Viewed from this different perspective, the role of the
judiciary in administering the Constitution should include the duty of arrest-
ing the very worst propensities of elected representatives to avoid their own
constitutional responsibilities.1 0 2 Consistent with that judicial role, the Court
must be encouraged to act in more than a single way. The recognition of a
greater congressional affirmative responsibility, pursuant to the horizontal ef-
fect of the sweeping clause, is but one appropriate way of several: to find
fewer instances of delegation by mere passive acquiescence; to tolerate fewer
instances of delegation of power by nonspecific, carte blanche transfers; and, in
general, to evidence a less uncritical acceptance of the supposed superiority of
an efficient, uncabined, imperial presidency. It was, after all, precisely by way
of responding to that tendency that Louis Brandeis reminded us some half-
century ago about the constitutional function of separated powers.
102. "The problem about Congress is simply this: not only does it not govern, it does not
want to govern." Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, With
Special Emphasis Upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REv. 583, 600 (1973). (At the
time of offering this remark, Professor Miller was serving as Chief Consultant to the Senate
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities.)
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